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ABSTRACT
Innovation and the adoption of new ideas are fundamental to economic progress. Here we examine
the underlying economics of the market for ideas. From a positive perspective, we examine how
such markets function with and without government intervention. From a normative perspective,
we examine the pitfalls of existing institutions, and how they might be improved. We highlight
recent research by ourselves and others challenging the notion that government awards of monopoly
through patents and copyright are “the way” to provide appropriate incentives for innovation.
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Central to understanding the market for ideas and the incentives for the adoption of
new ideas is understanding how ideas might be diﬀerent from other goods. The starting point
of the economic analysis of innovation is to recognize that the economically relevant unit is
a copy of an idea. That is, typically, many copies of an idea exist in physical form, such as
ab o o k ,ac o m p u t e rﬁle or a piece of equipment, or in the form of knowledge embodied in
people who know and understand the idea. Only these copies matter, ﬁrst, in the sense that
if they were all to be erased, the idea would no longer have any economic value, and, second,
in the sense that the copies are extremely good substitutes for each other: whether a copy of
an idea is the original copy or the hundredth copy, it is equally economically useful. From the
perspective of the functioning of markets, then, property rights in copies of ideas are assured
by the ordinary laws against theft–what is ordinarily referred to as “intellectual property”
protects not the ownership of copies of ideas, but rather a monopoly over how other people
make use of their copies of an idea.
Common legal and economic wisdom argues that competitive markets are not suitable
for trading copies of ideas, as ideas are intrinsically diﬀerent from other economic commodi-
ties. For the most part these arguments are incorrect. However, there is one dimension in
which economists agree that ideas diﬀer in an important way from other goods: The ﬁrst
copy of an idea must generally be produced as a single indivisible unit. For example, two ﬁrst
halves of a book are not a good substitute for both the ﬁrst and second halves. Although
most goods are subject to some degree of indivisibility, quantitatively, the indivisibility is
crucial for ideas. In much of the economics literature, especially in Romer [1], the cost of
this indivisibility is referred to as a ﬁxed cost to emphasize the fact that it is paid onceregardless of how many copies are later produced. The key economic question this raises
is whether in competitive markets there is adequate incentive to produce the ﬁrst copy of
an idea. Earlier work, such as that of Romer [1], suggests that because sales take place at
marginal cost after the ﬁxed cost is incurred without legal protection, leaving no proﬁtt o
recoup the ﬁxed cost, the answer to the question is negative; without legal protection there
is inadequate incentive to innovate. However, we point out that this is the case only if one
assumes that either marginal costs are zero (copies of ideas are perfectly nonrivalrous goods)
or capacity constraints are not binding even immediately after the innovation takes place. In
reality, and in the theory we develop, copies of ideas are rivalrous goods and there are gener-
ally capacity constraints–hence, unless the innovator and his competitors can instantly ﬂood
the market with copies, ideas will always generate some rents for their creator. This gives
r i s et oad i ﬀerent theory, where innovations may or may not arise in competitive markets,
depending on the size of the initial indivisibility or ﬁxed cost, the speed at which capacity is
built up, the size of the market, and the elasticity of demand. From a practical perspective,
the issue is whether competitive rents are enough to give creators the incentive to invent an
adequate number of socially valuable ideas. Making creators fabulously rich is not a relevant
issue, unless this is an essential part of the incentive to create. Compensating creators for
the opportunity cost creative activity involves is the economic issue to be addressed by the
normative theory of innovation.
Along most other dimensions, ideas are not diﬀerent from other commodities, and
those few dimensions along which ideas are diﬀerent do not generally aﬀect the functioning
of competitive markets.
21. It is argued that in competitive markets innovators would be unable to appropriate
more than an inﬁnitesimal share of the social value of their ideas. This misses the fact
that ideas combine attributes of both consumption and capital goods. They can be
used directly for consumption, such as reading a book or watching a movie, or they can
be used as an input in production, by making copies of a book or movie or by producing
other goods, for example, by using the idea for an improved production process. That
the original copy of an idea is the capital good (the tree) from which all other copies
(the fruits) must originate enables innovators to appropriate the net present value of
all future copies through competitive pricing. Corn seeds, for example, can be eaten or
used for producing additional corn, so they also combine characteristics of consumption
and capital goods. Competitive markets for corn generate the appropriate incentive to
invest in corn seed.
2. The initial copy (or copies, when simultaneous innovation occurs) of an idea is generally
produced through a process which is diﬀerent from the one used to make subsequent
copies, as in the case of original research versus teaching. Most capital goods (original
research) are used to produce commodities other than themselves–but the fact that
capital goods might be used to reproduce themselves poses no particular problem for
competitive markets. In the semiconductor industry, for example, reduction in chip
size makes it possible to construct capital equipment that can be used to produce even
smaller chips.
3. There are suggestions that ideas are subject to “spillover externalities,” or what we
might call informational leakage. That is, the existence of the idea enables people
to learn it and make use of it without the permission of the original inventor. Some
3even argue that ideas can be copied for free. In practice, few ideas are subject to
informational leakage, and in all cases they are costly to reproduce. In the case of
copyrightable creations, where the ideas are embodied in physical objects such as books,
informational leakage is not an issue. In the case of scientiﬁca d v a n c e s ,r e ﬂection shows
that it is also not the case. While in some sense scientiﬁc ideas are widely available,
usable copies of scientiﬁc ideas are not so easy to come by. Even Newton’s laws require
a substantial amount of time and eﬀort to understand. For all practical purposes copies
are limited to those people who understand the laws and books that explain them.
Without paying someone to teach you or buying a book that explains Newton’s laws,
you are not terribly likely to learn them merely because they are in the public domain.
As teachers and professors, we earn our living by our ability to communicate ideas to
others, and in doing so creating new copies of them. Overwhelming historical evidence
shows that diﬀusion and adoption of innovations are costly and time-consuming.
4. The extent to which ideas resemble other goods can be seen by examining the “public
domain” for creative works for which copyright has expired. Although legal scholars
have tended to view the public domain as a commons, like the atmosphere or ocean for
which there are no property rights, in fact, the market for a public domain book is very
similar to the market for wheat or any other competitively provided good or service.
Once copyright has expired, there are many copies of a book, each a good substitute
for the other, and each owned by someone. If you want to read the book, make copies,
or turn it into a movie, you must ﬁrst buy the book from one of the current owners.
If there are many owners, each competing with the others to sell you the book, you
may be able to obtain it relatively cheaply, even though you intend to turn it into
4a highly valued movie. But the fact that you can buy ingredients cheaply is a good
consequence of competitive markets, not a bad one. In fact, the evidence suggests that
the market for goods in the public domain functions well, with copies widely available
and reasonably priced: ﬁnding a copy of a book by Dickens, for example, is no great
problem.
5. Lawyers have also made other arguments as to why ideas might be diﬀerent from other
goods; but many of these arguments reﬂect a lack of understanding of how markets
function. For example, it is often argued that without the monopoly provided by copy-
right, there would be an inadequate incentive to “promote” works such as books, music
and movies, since the beneﬁt of the promotional eﬀort would be shared by competitors.
However, this argument applies equally well to other competitive markets, such as that
for wheat. The point to understand is that under monopoly, goods are priced high,
and the consumer receives little beneﬁt. Hence, the monopolist has an incentive to
subsidize information to the consumer. In competitive markets, the competitors do not
have incentive to subsidize information, so consumers must pay the cost of obtaining
it. Information about wheat is widely available–from doctors, diet advisers, books,
magazines, and many other sources–but not directly from wheat producers. In com-
petitive markets, not only is information widely available, but it is less biased than the
subsidized information provided by monopolists. Markets for ideas are no diﬀerent in
this respect. Plentiful information is available about works in the public domain–but
that information is not generally provided by book publishers.
52. Materials and Methods
In this section we introduce the basic model to be used in the foregoing analysis; we
concentrate ﬁrst on the relationship between the presence of an indivisibility in the innova-
tion technology and the functioning of competitive innovation. It is useful to consider the
simpliﬁed market for an idea studied by Quah [2] and Boldrin and Levine [3], [4] and [5]. We
begin by ignoring the indivisibility so as to understand how the competitive market would
lead to eﬃcient provision of ideas, then we analyze the impact of indivisibility. We begin by
supposing that x0 initial copies of an idea can be produced at a per-copy cost of µ.A ta n y
moment of time t there are xt copies in existence. As an extreme but innocuous assumption,
we imagine that copies of ideas can simultaneously be consumed and reproduced, so that a
utility of u(xt) is obtained by consumers from consuming xt copies of the idea, while simulta-
neously the number of copies available grows at a constant rate, ˙ xt = βxt. For simplicity we
use the quadratic utility u(xt)=2 ρ[2(x/xc) − (x/xc)2] for x ≤ xc and u(xt)=2 ρ for x>x c.
Here ρ is a measure of the “quality” of the idea, a concept we explore below. Observe that the
utility maximum u(xt)=2 ρ is reached at xt = xc,w h i c ho c c u r sa tt i m eτ =( 1 /β)ln(xc/x0),





τ e−tu(xc)dt, where time units have been normalized so that
t h es u b j e c t i v ei n t e r e s tr a t ei so n e .
Suppose that the technology for reproducing copies is available to everyone, so that
anyone who has a copy can make and sell further copies; in other words, there is no intellec-
tual property. The crucial thing to understand is that because the reproduction technology
exhibits constant returns to scale, all of the proceeds from the sale of the idea accrue to the
owners of the original copies. For a more general technology, which uses inputs other than
6copies of the idea itself, the proceeds net of the opportunity cost of those other inputs will
also accrue to the owners of the original copies. This is due to competition; that is, there will
be many people seeking to proﬁt by making copies of the idea. Think here of a Napster-like
distribution system for MP3s, albeit one in which owners of MP3s can legally sell copies. If
the amount that I can earn by buying MP3s and selling copies, net of my personal cost, is
positive, then you will compete with me to buy MP3s and sell copies, driving up the price of
the existing copies we are each trying to obtain and driving down that of the copies we are
each trying to sell. Ultimately, this competition between resellers means that they all earn
zero proﬁts. This is not true of the original creators, because, once they produce the initial
copies, they own a factor which is in ﬁxed supply; the value of the latter, as we shall see,
depends on the speed of reproduction and circumstances of demand.
Competitive provision of copies implies that the price of copies at time t is the marginal
social value of an additional copy, u0(xt). Hence, if λ is the number of consumers, and the
original producer(s) of the idea face competition for creating the ﬁrst copies of the idea, the









Competitive innovators maximize proﬁts taking prices as given. This is solved by choosing
x in such a way that the marginal cost µ of producing an additional initial copy of the idea

















This is the condition for eﬃcient provision of any good. Note that, in equilibrium, the
individually optimal choice of x must equal the aggregate initial capital x0.T h i s a n a l y s i s
points out the way in which competitive markets for production that takes place over time
function with goods that have both capital and consumption attributes. Here, there is no
economic problem to be solved that is not already solved by the competitive marketplace.
The problem that arises, as we have indicated, is that of indivisibility. Assume this is
such that a choice of x0 < 1 implies no innovation at all. It may be, depending on conditions
of demand relative to µ, that the optimal initial choice of capital for a competitive innovator
is x0 < 1, so that this indivisibility binds. In this case, the only realistic option is to choose
x0 =1 . Although the creator still receives a positive revenue of P,i ti si n s u ﬃcient to
compensate for the cost of creation µ, and so the good is not produced. We should indicate
that although it is easy to work out the consequences of a binding indivisibility in this simple
setting, general equilibrium theorists have yet to create a comprehensive theory of competitive
equilibrium with binding indivisibilities.
In the case of indivisibility, the issue is whether the revenue stream P,e v a l u a t e da tt h e
minimum innovation size x0 =1 ,i ss u ﬃcient to compensate for the cost of creation µ.I nt h e
extreme case in which β →∞ , revenue P → 0; in this case, no innovation would take place
at all. It is a not uncommon confusion to believe that this limit case is in fact the ordinary
8case. Both theory and evidence suggest that competition generates substantial revenues for
innovators in most practical cases and that binding indivisibilities are the exception, not
the rule. Note also a second common source of confusion: the revenue stream P accruing
to the innovator almost never corresponds to the full social value of the new idea. This is
more so when the indivisibility x0 ≥ 1 is binding, and P may be a relatively small fraction
of the total additional utility the innovation will bring to society. But this fact is of no
concern for economic eﬃciency, as long as P ≥ µ holds; institutions that allow creators to be
compensated for the opportunity cost of their eﬀort yield socially eﬃcient outcomes. Making
creators extremely wealthy is a by-product that is welcome to them, but unnecessary to
society.
Remark. The creator may have a unique idea, in which case he faces no competition
for providing it. He is a monopolist in the initial period and maximizes the objective function
λ
R ∞
0 e−tu0(xeβt)xeβtdt − µx with respect to x. Notice that here he no longer takes present
and future prices u0(xeβt) as given, and the solution to this problem is generally to produce
too few initial copies of the idea. However, in the case where the indivisibility binds, the
producer is still forced to provide a single initial copy, and his monopoly over the unique idea
is irrelevant.
3. Results
First mover advantages: There is plentiful evidence that in practice the indivisibil-
ity of ideas is not more substantial than that of other commodities, for example, automobile
plants or shipyards. There is also much evidence that ideas ﬂourish in competitive markets
without government intervention in the form of patents and copyright. However, for books,
9music and movies, it is easy to imagine that changes in computer technology that make copy-
ing cheaper and more rapid will lead to a β so large as to cause xt to expand so rapidly as to
ﬂood the market and drive the price to zero almost immediately. As we observed, as β →∞
the revenue P → 0. It is worth noting that the same technological change is reducing the cost
of books, music, and movies creation as well, so that µ → 0 also, and this may well oﬀset the
improved copying technology. Moreover, even if we accept that the market for copies may
be quickly ﬂooded, there are still tremendous advantages in being ﬁrst. We will not attempt
to enumerate all of those advantages here. In the case of innovations, secrecy is an obvious
method of generating a short-term monopoly. In the case of books and movies, most sales
take place within three months of initial release. So if it is possible to keep copies encrypted
for even so short a period of time, substantial revenues may be realized regardless of the
quality of copying technology. Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry suggests that the
ﬁrst mover advantage is quite substantial, be it due to reputation eﬀects, slow information
diﬀusion, or simply “capture” of the medical profession. In any case, the evidence shows
that most generic drugs, selling at a quarter of the price and being clinically and functionally
perfect substitutes for the original products, never capture more than 50% of the market
(Caves et al. [6], CBO [7]). This is of course not decisive evidence: it could be that the
monopoly provided by the patent is important in building consumer loyalty that persists
after the patent expires. In the case of ﬁnancial securities, we do have stronger evidence on
t h ep r e s e n c eo faﬁrst mover advantage–until the State Street Decision in 1998, ﬁnancial
securities could not be patented, and as documented by Tofuno [8], among others, there was
thriving innovation driven by a strong ﬁrst mover advantage. Although imitation was rapid,
the ﬁrst mover successfully maintained the bulk of the market against imitators.
10The pharmaceutical industry makes much more extensive use of patents than other
industries, and the expense of bringing a new drug to market, including the cost of clinical
trials and failures, is estimated by DiMasi et al. [9] at $231 million in 1987 dollars. Would
not, as the industry argues, eliminating patents in that industry cause innovation to come to
a screeching halt? We should point out ﬁrst that patents are only one part of government
regulation of pharmaceuticals–the FDA supervision of clinical trials, the subsidy of basic
research in the area and the large government purchases of drugs being other key elements.
It would be hard to make sense of a proposal that would eliminate patent protection, while
allowing competitors to freely make use of the results of expensive clinical trials. However, if
competitors were required to choose between either purchasing (possibly at a price regulated
by the government) the results of trials or conducting their own trials, a substantial ﬁrst mover
advantage would be preserved. The cost of research prior to trials is heavily subsidized, and
the subsidy could be increased. It should be recognized also, as we discuss below, that the
elimination of patents would have a positive eﬀect on innovation, by allowing researchers
to freely use each other’s results without the need to obtain patent clearances. One almost
certain eﬀect is that it would eliminate the considerable eﬀort wasted in inventing “work
alike” drugs in an eﬀo r tt os h a r ei nal u c r a t i v em o n o p o l y .
The ﬁrst mover advantage is a form of monopoly accruing to the original innovator. A
monopolist, unlike a competitor, will not allow quantity xt to expand to xc, which drops the
price to zero, but will restrict output to xc/2, which maximizes his revenues. In the limit, as
β →∞output jumps almost immediately to xc/2, resulting in a revenue to the monopolist
of λρ.I ft h i sr e v e n u ec a nb ec a p t u r e do n l yf o raf r a c t i o no ft i m eφ, then the corresponding
revenue is φλρ. For computational simplicity, we will focus hereafter on the case of β large,
11although it considerably understates the beneﬁts of competition. The ﬁrst mover advantage
here may be represented by a fraction φ
F representing time before competitors are able to
successfully enter the market. Patent and copyright monopolies can be represented by a
fraction φ>φ
F representing the duration of the legal protection.
We have seen how, under some circumstances, there may be underprovision of ideas
due to indivisibility. We turn now to the traditional solution to this problem: the government
provision of monopoly through patents and copyright. That is, by granting control over how
all copies of an idea are used, the government allows the patent or copyright holder to limit
reproduction and restrict supply. This increases proﬁts, and so provides greater incentive to
create or innovate. There are, however, a number of problems with this solution.
Sequential innovation: Since a monopolist is scarcely likely to earn less than a
competitor, it might seem that whatever the problems associated with monopoly, government
grants of monopoly for innovation at least increase the incentive to innovate. But, just as
most commodities are produced by means of other commodities, so are ideas. Innovations
build on past innovations–so while raising the proﬁt from innovation, granting monopoly on
newly created ideas also raises the cost of future new ideas.
Sequential innovation and the way in which patents inhibit innovation have been stud-
ied by Scotchmer [10] and by Boldrin and Levine [3], [5]. We illustrate this with a simple
example, collapsing the dynamic model introduced above into a static one in which β = ∞.
Utility continues to be 2ρ[2(x/xc) − (x/xc)2]. A monopolist will produce xc/2,r e s u l t i n gi n
a revenue of λρ. A competitive innovator with a ﬁrst mover advantage will get a revenue of
φ
Fλρ. Suppose that to produce the new idea requires the use of N existing ideas. We imagine
that each of these many ideas is small, so that the cost of producing a copy of the idea is
12 /N. Without government monopoly, there will be many copies of each of these existing ideas
competing with each other, and the inventor can obtain all N of them for a total cost of  .
Without government intervention, this socially desirable invention will take place, provided
only that φ
Fλρ >  .
Suppose on the other hand that the government-awarded monopoly applies to all
innovations and that the owners of the N existing ideas only know that ρ is drawn from a
uniform distribution over [0,ρ].E a c h s e t s a p r i c e pi at which he will license his invention.
Then, if owners of all the other existing ideas are setting the price p, each owner of an existing
idea receives an expected revenue of
λρ − (N − 1)p − pi
λρ
pi.
If  <λ ρ/2, the Nash equilibrium of this game is at p = λρ/(N+1), and therefore the inventor
must pay N
N+1λρ to clear the needed rights for his own innovation, and so he innovates if he





This occurs with probability 1/N. By way of contrast, without monopoly the probability of
innovation is 1− /(φ
Fλρ). As the number of existing rights that must be cleared increases, the
probability of innovation under monopoly is smaller than that under competition and drops
toward zero. Here the additional incentive for innovation under an intellectual property
regime is more than completely oﬀset by the additional cost it imposes on innovation. As
13technologies grow more and more complex, requiring more and more specialized inputs, the
monopoly power induced by patents and copyright becomes more and more socially damaging.
Rent-seeking: One of the key problems with government grants of monopoly is the
rent-seeking it induces. That is, when governments give away monopolies, there is incentive
for would-be monopolists to waste resources competing for the award. In the case of intellec-
tual monopolies, the resources wasted by competing would-be monopolists take several forms.
The most widely studied is the patent race, where too much eﬀort is invested in innovating
quickly in order to be the ﬁrst to get the patent. Another classical problem is the eﬀort
wasted building “work alike” innovations in order to get a portion of the monopoly. This is
the case, for example, in textbooks, where every textbook is just diﬀerent enough from the
best-seller in the ﬁeld to avoid violating the copyright. It is also the case in pharmaceuticals,
w h e r em o r et i m ea n de ﬀort are spent developing copycat drugs to get the share of a lucrative
market than are spent developing genuinely new drugs.
One of the worst aspects of public rent-seeking is the regulatory capture or “monopoly
creep” it induces. In the case of regulation, it has been observed that over time the regulatory
agency becomes captured by the regulated industry, and far from imposing the public interest
on the industry, serves instead to enable collusion and monopolistic practices within the
industry. Similarly, in the case of patents and copyrights, over time both the scope and
duration of monopoly power have been increased as a consequence of constant rent-seeking.
The term of copyright has risen in the United States, for example, from 28 years to 95 years;
and many areas of thriving innovation not traditionally subject to patents, such as business
practices, are now patentable. So while in a theoretical sense, it might be desirable to have
copyrights and patents lasting a few months or a few years, as a practical matter, once
14copyrights and patents are allowed at all, their term and scope are likely to begin to creep
upward.
The existence of public rent-seeking is not to say that there is not private rent-seeking
as well. For example, in the absence of patents, innovators are likely to increase their reliance
on trade secrecy. Indeed, one argument for patents is that they replace trade secrecy and
force innovators to reveal the secrets of their inventions. Unfortunately, as anyone who has
read a patent will realize, the “secret,” if there is one, is rarely revealed in a useful way in
the patent application. And since patents last 20 years, the only reason to get a patent is
if the inventor thinks he cannot keep the secret for that long. We have studied this issue in
Boldrin and Levine [11], showing that creating public rent-seeking is not a good way to solve
the problem of private rent-seeking.
Optimal duration of intellectual monopoly: Although intellectual monopoly may
encourage socially desirable innovation, it has a number of drawbacks, as we have seen. These
range from the traditional fact that monopolies overprice and undersupply to rent-seeking
and the discouragement of subsequent innovation. To understand more clearly the trade-oﬀ
involved with government awards of monopoly, we examine a simple example in which we
abstract from rent-seeking, sequential innovation and competitive rents. We focus only on the
traditional monopoly undersupply and ask, In a world in which ideas are of variable quality,
what is the optimal level of protection φ? Unlike in an earlier economics literature pioneered
by Gilbert and Shapiro [12] and discussed at length in Gallini and Scotchmer [13], we follow
Grossman and Lai [14] and Boldrin and Levine [15] in taking a general equilibrium approach
in which there are many innovations.
Suppose the ﬁrst copy of any idea has a unit cost of creation and that the factor used
15in producing the ﬁrst copy is abundant and inelastically supplied; reproduction costs are zero.
We continue to use u(x)=2 ρ[2(x/xc)−(x/xc)2] for consumer utility. The social value of the
idea under monopoly is (3/2)ρ and under competition, 2ρ. Under monopoly, revenue equals
ρ; hence, the latter is also a measure of the private value of a good for the monopolistic
innovator. We let φ denote the fraction of the time the producer has a monopoly; without
government intervention this is φ
F due to ﬁrst mover advantage. By providing copyright
and/or patent protection, the government can raise φ to any higher value up to a limit of 1.
There are λ consumers. Then ideas will be produced for which private revenue exceeds cost;
that is, φλρ ≥ 1. In particular, without government intervention, so φ = φ
F,a st h es i z eo f
the economy λ grows, the quality of the marginal idea that is produced, ρ =1 /φ
Fλ, declines,
and more ideas are produced. We continue to suppose that ideas are uniformly distributed
on [0,ρ]. We must set φ>1/(λρ) if any ideas are to be produced at all. Assuming this is the
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16set φ =1 . Notice third that we can characterize the solution by multiplying the welfare
derivative by the positive amount 4λφ
3.F o rλ <λ≤ λ




3DφW =0 ,a n dt h es i g no fDφ[4λφ
3DφW] is negative at φ
∗. Finally, as Dλ[4λφ
3DφW]
is also negative, it follows from the implicit function theorem that
∂φ∗
∂λ < 0 for λ <λ≤ λ
F.
Hence, the optimal degree of patent protection is decreasing in the size of the market, strictly
so in the range λ <λ≤ λ
F.
In summary, we conclude that if the government is to grant monopolies, they should be
limited, as they are, by time limits in the case of both patents and copyright. As the market
expands through economic growth and trade, these limits should gradually be tightened, until
eventually no grants of monopoly are necessary at all. Unfortunately, this appears to be the
opposite of what has happened.
4. Discussion
Our own conclusion, based on empirical as well as theoretical considerations, is that
on balance it would be best to eliminate patents and copyrights altogether. We have seen
that markets for ideas are not so diﬀerent from other markets. At one time government
grants of monopoly were widely used as a revenue extraction mechanism, and this is still true
in the developing world today. Today we are skeptical about government monopolies. The
government monopolies in Eastern Europe not only produced fewer lower quality goods at
greater cost, but managed to do greater harm to the environment in the process. In developed
economies we have gradually replaced ineﬃcient government grants of monopoly with more
eﬃcient mechanisms. Although many economists would not recommend eliminating patents
and copyrights altogether, all recognize a strong need for reform. We suggest that insofar as
17it is desirable for the government to provide extra incentives for invention and creation, it is
not best done through grants of monopoly, but rather through proven mechanisms such as
subsidies, prizes or monopoly regulated through mandatory licensing. Just as the world has
used the World Trade Organization process to gradually harmonize a lower international level
of tariﬀs, increasing greatly the beneﬁts of the free market, so too it should be possible through
international collaboration such as trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights to
harmonize substantial reductions in patent and copyright protection, greatly increasing the
beneﬁts of free trade in ideas.
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